INTRODUCTION
follows an easy trail blazed by government enforcers and adds little of public benefit to government sanctions. 4 Yet others contend that, in light of government enforcement, private cases lead to excessive deterrence.
5
One common criticism of private actions in general -and of class actions in particular -is that they are a form of legalized blackmail or extortion, one in which plaintiffs" attorneys coerce defendants into settlements based not on meritorious claims, but rather on the cost of litigation or fear of an erroneous and catastrophic judgment.
6
These actions also are said to discourage legitimate competitive behavior. 7 For these and related reasons, many members of the antitrust community call for the curtailment of private enforcement; 8 some even call for its abolition.
9
Although these criticisms are widespread, they have been made without any systematic empirical evidence. 10 Those who point to the alleged flaws of our system of Government enforcement also is imperfect.
5
The purpose and design of the study
This chapter discusses a study that serves as a first step towards providing the empirical data necessary to assess the benefits of private antitrust enforcement. With the support of the American Antitrust Institute and a variety of research assistants, the authors of the study analyzed the compensation and deterrence effects from a group of 40 recent, successful, large-scale private antitrust cases. Among other things, the authors examined the amount of money recovered for victims, what proportion of the money was recovered from foreign entities, whether the private litigation was preceded by government action, and on whose behalf money was recovered (direct purchasers, indirect purchasers, or a competitor). To our knowledge, no similar study has ever been undertaken.
It is important to note that this study does not purport to be comprehensive or in any way definitive. It does not analyze every recent significant private antitrust case, assess a random sample of cases, or even include all of the largest or "most important" ones.
13
The authors simply tried to assemble and evaluate 40 of the largest and most successful cases that concluded between 1990 and 2007.
14 13
For example, we were not able to include an analysis of the consumer class action suits against Microsoft, even though a highly respected journalist reported that together these cases recovered more than $ For simplicity we are calling all of the charges "allegations," even the ones proven in court.
19 All figures include the awarded attorneys" fees. Although a federal court verdict would produce treble damages for victims, almost all of our cases involved settlements, and in no case did a court determine the percentage overcharge. We know of no way to determine whether any of the settlements exceeded single damages.
20
See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 1, at Table 14.   21 Cases were not selected for this project on the basis of whether a foreign defendant was likely to be involved.
22
When conduct gave rise to both government and private litigation, we tried to ascertain who first uncovered the antitrust violation. However, because government records are confidential and the enforcers usually do not reveal or discuss their investigations, we could not always make definitive classifications.
Because we had access only to publicly available information, some of our classifications could be mistaken. For further discussion of the interplay between public and private enforcement, see Chapter 11 of this
Handbook.
8
plaintiffs apparently uncovered the alleged violations and initiated and pursued the litigation, with the government following the private plaintiffs" lead or playing no role at all. Another $4.212 billion came from cases with a mixed private/public origin. 23 Only about a third of the total private recovery -$6.163 to $6.446 billion -came from cases that were purely public in origin.
Still other private cases followed a government investigation but provided significantly greater relief than the government action (if, indeed, the government brought an action). Some cases also expanded the scope of inquiry into the challenged conduct and the claims against the defendant, or they helped plaintiffs to obtain relief from parties not included in the government actions. The high proportion of private actions that supplanted, co-originated with, or enhanced government enforcement is perhaps surprising. There were still other instances where the authors of the study were not able to ascertain the origin of a case.
24
The authors documented a total of $18.006 to $19.639 billion (using nominal dollars) in recoveries by direct purchasers, indirect purchasers, or competitors. 
26
See Benefits: Individual Case Studies, supra note 1, at 13-18 (Auction House case summaries). These coupons traded for a value that reflected their discounted present value. They also comprised 20 percent of the legal fees paid to prevailing attorneys, who said they will redeem them for cash after the expiration of the mandatory five year waiting period.
27
See id. at 77-87 (El Paso case summary).
28
See, e.g., id. at 110-113 (Insurance case summary). This case resulted in a cash settlement with a creative remedy that: (1) funded the development of a public entity that provides risk management education and technical services to small businesses, public entities, and non-profits; and (2) provided funding to states to develop a risk database for municipalities and local governments. Id.
Cy pres is a type of remedy that is available in some class actions where there are funds left over after the class members have been compensated, or the funds are insufficient to distribute to the class members in an economically efficient manner. The court has discretion to award these funds to the "next best" usage In attempting to compare the deterrence value of private enforcement to the deterrence value of DOJ criminal enforcement, the authors of the study faced the vexing task of setting a value -or a disvalue, cost, or disincentive effect -on prison time and house arrest. To the extent that prison time is incomparable to anything that can be valued monetarily, the task may be impossible. But the authors of the study at least attempted to make a rough approximation.
As a starting point, it is clear that prison time should not be valued -or disvaluedinfinitely. Cartelists do not act as if they infinitely fear prison time because they often decide to form cartels and risk that outcome. Rather, potential offenders appear to calculate, at least to some very uncertain degree, their chances of getting caught and the prison sentences and fines they are likely to face. 41 They balance this, in some extremely rough way that only they know, against cartel rewards. Because it is common knowledge that people often go to prison for fixing prices, and yet corporate officials continue attempting to form new cartels, the deterrence effects of prison time must be less than infinite.
The authors of the study identified five possible approaches to valuing prison time.
All five approaches were incorporated into the study in the hope that doing so would increase the reliability of results. The approaches include: (1) the valuations for lives and years of life that are used for various regulatory and public policy purposes; (2) tort awards for loss of a life in wrongful death cases; (3) Victim Compensation Fund to victims" families; (4) the compensation provided to people who have been wrongly imprisoned; and (5) similar estimates by scholars in the field.
42
The five approaches yielded estimates that are broadly consistent with one another. 43 To be conservative, the authors of the study took the highest of these estimates for the disvalue or deterrence equivalent of a year in prison, $1,500,000 per year, and increased it to $2 million. 44 They used $1,000,000 for the disvalue or deterrence equivalent of a year of house arrest.
Although it is frequently assumed that corporations always engage in profit maximizing behavior, the authors of the study also allowed that executives might care much more about personal consequences than consequences to their corporations. This is in keeping with other common exceptions to profit maximization assumptions, such as the effects of agent/principal relationships. Although it is not possible to correct for these problems precisely, the authors took the arbitrary step of tripling the deterrence effects of all individual sanctions relative to corporate sanctions. As a result, a year of prison time was valued -or disvalued -at $6 million 45 rather than $2 million, and a year of house arrest at $3 million rather than $1 million. The authors also tripled the individual fine 42 See Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 1. 43 Id. 44 Two million dollars is probably significantly more than the true cost or deterrence value of a year in prison, but this figure was used in order to take a conservative and relatively non-controversial approach. 45 Valuing a year"s worth of life at $6 million would mean that a twenty-year prison sentence would be valued at $120 million, a figure far in excess of the amount that society places on an individual"s life. impossible to know how many cartels were deterred by the equivalent of $6.8 billion in sanctions, surely the number must be substantial.
Deterrence from private antitrust litigation
As discussed earlier in this chapter, empirical research into the deterrence value of private antitrust litigation, during any period, is virtually nonexistent. However, the 40 cases that (in nominal dollars).
47
In other words, the deterrence effects from just the cash awards from these 40 private cases nearly tripled the estimated total deterrence value of the DOJ anti-cartel program, a figure that includes the deterrence effects of corporate fines, individual fines (artificially trebled), restitution, prison time valued at $6 million per year, and house arrest valued at $3 million per year. Note that this is not a comparison of the full deterrence effects from these 40 private cases to the full deterrence effects secured by the DOJ in the same 40 cases. This is a comparison of only the cash-based deterrence effects from just 40 private cases to the full estimated deterrence effects from every DOJ cartel case filed during the same seventeen-year period.
It is true that not all of these 40 cases were against cartels; some were against monopolies and other arrangements. The 25 collusion cases in the study secured a total of $9.200 to $10.600 billion. 48 Comparing this amount to the DOJ total of $6.800 billion shows that even these 25 private collusion cases alone probably deterred more anticompetitive behavior than the entire DOJ anti-cartel enforcement program.
Moreover, because this study surveyed only 40 private cases, it significantly underestimates the deterrence effects of all private enforcement during the same period.
Also recall that the study conservatively valued coupons, discounts, products and injunctive relief as being worth nothing.
One important complication with these results is worth noting, however these private cases were follow-ups to government prosecutions. 49 As a result, some of the credit for the deterrence caused by these private recoveries should go to the government enforcers for uncovering and prosecuting the violations. But even where the government discovered the cartels, private cases ultimately secured the damages. Private plaintiffs therefore should get much of the credit for the resulting deterrence in these cases, though the credit should be shared with the government enforcers.
Were the private actions good cases?
It is very difficult for critics of private enforcement to make a credible case that the combination of public and private enforcement in the United States has caused over- 
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with indicators does not add up to 34 (or 31) because eight cases had more than one indicator.) All told, it is much more likely that most if not all of the recoveries reflect defendants" perceptions that they could well lose on the merits, not only at trial but also on appeal. How likely is a firm that did nothing wrong to nevertheless pay $50 million or even $500 million in settlement? While this could happen on occasion, the argument loses credibility as settlements get higher.
At the same time, objective observers should ask to see evidence that most private cases lack merit, as critics suggest. Scant such evidence exists. Defendants" self-serving anecdotes, assertions, and protestations should carry no more weight than those of their plaintiff counterparts.
Conclusions
This chapter has not attempted to perform an overall cost/benefit analysis of U.S. private antitrust enforcement. To be sure, private enforcement has many flaws and problems, and many private actions have not been in the public interest. However, the debate over private enforcement should have balance, and it should be grounded in empiricism. The study discussed in this chapter suggests that the flaws of U.S. private antitrust enforcement have been greatly exaggerated, on the basis of no evidence except the self- As to the possibility that U.S. private enforcement could lead to over-deterrence, it is important to remember that, for practical purposes, victims have only a nominal right to recover "treble damages." In reality, various constraints on recovery mean that, even after trebling of a judgment at trial, plaintiffs likely recover less than single actual damages. 58 To get closer to a full recovery, for example, these settlements would have to compensate victims for unawarded prejudgment interest. 59 They also should compensate 58 To the extent the purpose of the remedy is compensation, the "damages" caused by an antitrust violation should consist of the sum of all relatively predictable harms caused by that violation affecting anyone other than the defendants. Damages should include the wealth transferred from consumers to the violator(s), as well as the allocative inefficiency effects felt by society, whether caused directly, or indirectly via "umbrella" effects. Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, the value of plaintiffs' time spent pursuing the case, and the cost to the American taxpayer of administering the judicial system should also be included. When all these adjustments are made it is likely that the United States "treble" damages remedy actually is less than single Commission noted, only an unproven assertion. 65 On the contrary, in the United States, anticompetitive conduct occurs far too frequently, despite the deterrence effects of our present system of private litigation.
Another benefit from private cases is that they have saved taxpayers a significant amount of money in foregone enforcement costs. Although government enforcers often will be best suited to uncover and win particular cases, sometimes government enforcers 
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subvert the free market in general and by foreign cartels in particular. 68 Although negative assertions about the efficacy of private U.S. antitrust litigation have been very well publicized, this might well be due less to the merits of these allegations than to the power of the economic interests that stand to benefit from a curtailment of private enforcement. 
